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Notes and Comments
TAXATION-PAYMENTS FOR ASSIGNMENT OR
CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS AS CAPITAL GAIN OR
ORDINARY INCOME
Extensive litigation has arisen recently on the question whether the
consideration received for the assignment or cancellation of contracts
constitutes ordinary income or capital gains. In order to receive the
more favorable treatment accorded long term capital gains two basic
requirements of the statute must be met: (1) there must be a sale or
exchange; and (2) the transaction must involve property which is a
capital asset. The statute does not define a sale or exchange and
defines a capital asset only in general terms.1 Hence specific factual
situations involving unusual types of property have been subject to
litigation, and it is believed that some categorization of the different
situations is discernible in the cases. The following discussion will
attempt to analyze and fit into categories the different transactions
involving assignments or cancellation of contract rights with regard
to whether or not capital gains treatment will be given.2 The point of
departure is to recognize that while contracts are property, not all
are capital assets, and the nature of the income that would normally
result from the fulfillment of the terms of the contract may be one
factor in the termination.3
The lease contract. A landlord was paid a lump sum by the tenant
for cancellation of a long term lease. The court held that "The can-
cellation of the lease involved nothing more than relinquishment of
the right to future rental payments in return for a present substitute
payment and possession of the leased premises."4 The case for capital
IINr. B v. ConE 117 (a) (1). A capital asset is defined with specific ex-
ceptions, not here material, as property held by the taxpayer. INT. REv. CODE
113 (a) merely puts a tax on a sale or exchange without further defining the terms.
2 However the division line between categories is not always so definite that
the twain shall never meet; and even if this were true, the taxpayer would be
very likely to have a fact situation which would not fit nicely into the definite
category. Therefore, answers must be found by analogy. The task is then to
analyze the categories and attempt to find one that is analogous to the fact situa-
tion in which the courts have allowed capital gains treatment.
I If the contract is equivalent to a right to receive income, the sale of the
contract will not convert the consideration received for the contract into a capital
asset. Shumlin v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 407 (1951) (payment of a lump sum
rather than royalties as a producer).
'Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U. S. 28, 32 (1941); But the owner of a life
tenancy in trust has a property right which he may sell to the remainderman
even though all his interest consists of is a right to receive income. McAllister v.
Commissioner, 157 F. 2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
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gains treatment failed because both requirements therefor were lack-
ing. The contract right to receive income did not meet the statutory
definition of a capital asset though it was valuable propertyY Secondly,
nothing was transferred to the tenant to constitute a sale or exchange;
there was merely a cancellation.6 But where a landlord paid a tenant
to cancel, the consideration received by the tenant has been held to be
a capital gain to the tenant.7 The tenant's right to possession was a
capital asset in his hands which could be transferred by a sale or ex-
change.8
The employment contract. E entered into an employment contract
with a corporation. When the contract had run for two years, a third
party made a secret agreement with the corporation to get the release
of E from his contract with the corporation. This plan was carried out,
and E was paid a lump sum of money for the cancellation of his con-
tract. The court held that E's employment contract, concededly prop-
erty in the constitutional sense in that it could not be arbitrarily legis-
lated away, was not a capital asset for tax purposes because it was
only a contingent right to receive compensation for services to be per-
formed in the future. Furthermore, the court pointed out that there
could not have been a sale because the contract was personal in nature
and depended upon a particular person's skill in performing the serv-
ices. Since no property was transferred, there was no sale but only
a termination or cancellation of the contract.9
A fringe case which is on its facts more favorable to the taxpayer
'Note the application of this principle in Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 181
F. 2d 50 (6th Cir. 1952) where payment for the assignment of stock dividends
declared but not paid yielded ordinary income to the assignor and likewise in
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940) where an insurance agent assigned
renewal commissions.
'Capital gains treatment has been denied in the following situations where
agreements between the original parties have been made to cancel or extinguish
an obligation: Milliken v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 243 (1950) (option to pur-
chase); Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F. 2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939) (compromise
and via dictum surrender of a promissory note); Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.
2d 982 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. den. 308 U. S. 576 (1940) (surrender of insurance
contracts); Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U. S. 436 (1939) (redemption of
bonds before maturity, but see La. Rrav. CODE sec. 117 (f) for present rule).
Commissioner v. Golonsky, 16 T. C. 1450 (1951), aff'd 200 F. 2d 72 3rd
Cir. 1952); Ray v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 438 (1953); but the Commissioner
has announced his nonacquiescence to McCue Bros. and Drumond v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T. C. 667 (1953), 1953 INT. REv. BtmL. No. 13 at 1, and see Rev
Rul 129, 1953 INT. REv. BULL. No. 16 at 2.8 A transfer by the tenant to a third person for a profit also yields capital
gains. Sutliff v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 446 (1942).
'McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 108 (1936); accord, Gann v. Com-
missioner, 41 B. T. A. 388 (1940); and compensation for past services resolved
into a contract of settlement is not a capital asset, Shuster v. Helvering, 42 B. T. A.
255 (1940), affd 121 F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1941); Parker v. Commissioner, 5 T. C.
1355 (1945).
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is Jessop v. Commnissioner.10 There the taxpayer sold nearly all of the
stock of a corporation which he owned to H in consideration of money
plus an agreement by the buyer to secure employment for the seller
with the corporation. Sometime after the employment contract was
procured, relations became strained and he sold his contract back to
the corporation, agreeing to refrain from engaging in the same type
of business for three years. He contended that this contract was part
of the consideration paid for the stock which he owned since the mar-
ket value of the stock was far in excess of the amount of money paid
for it. The court held that even though the employment contract was
an inducement for the sale of the taxpayer's stock, it was not part of
the consideration. This was a contract for personal services which
had to be rendered before any compensation would be paid. There-
fore, the taxpayer's receipts for his agreement to cancel his contract
and not to engage in the same line of business for three years was
ordinary income. It seems that the court considered the situation be-
fore it a covenant not to compete.
The Gustav Hirsch case" is presented to demonstrate how only a
nuance in the fact situation may result in a court's finding capital
gains rather than ordinary income. An agreement was formed between
a corporation and B whereby B was to use his knowledge and efforts
to obtain stock in certain corporations. All funds were advanced by
the corporation and a holding company was to be created with B
given a certain amount of stock. The holding company was never
organized and the corporation paid B $162,000 for his interest. The
transaction was held to result in a capital gain. This was said to be
in the nature of a joint adventure rather than compensation for
services.
As to employment contracts, then, the essential point is that the
courts will consider a sale or extinguishment between employer and
employee, or even a third party, simply as an assignment of the right
to receive income. The fact that such contracts are property in the
constitutional sense does not mean that they are capital assets for tax
purposes. The difficulty is said to be that the assignment of the right
to receive income does not change the inherent nature of this right.
Furthermore, it is asserted that one cannot assign a contract to per-
form personal services, because the services depend upon the skill of
the particular person who has contracted to perform. Hence, there is
no actual assignment, but really only a termination of the contract, so
- 16 T. C. 491 (1951); accord, Becken v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 498 (1945).
n B. T. A. Memo Op. Dkts. 101478-9 (Jan. 30, 1942) as cited in 3 MEaRmTNs,
INcoim TAXATIoN, supplement 303 (1953); But cf. Rosenberg v. Commissioner,
15 T. C. 1 (1950), Worm v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 86 (1931).
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that no property reaches the transferee in order to satisfy the sale or
exchange requirement. The fringe cases reveal that even though an
employment contract was the inducement if not the consideration for
a stock transfer, the contract is nothing more than a right to receive
compensation for services to be performed in the future, and it will
not be considered a capital asset. However, if the taxpayer is able to
satisfy the court that he is more in the nature of a joint adventurer or
partner than an employee his transaction may be given capital gains
treatment.
The covenant not to compete is in the nature of a promise not to
work for others or for one's self for a given period. This is the con-
verse of a promise to work-it is a negative covenant. In Cox v. Hel-
veringL- A was the principal stockholder of a corporation which had
been bought by Y. Y refused to carry out the purchase unless A would
contract not to re-enter the ice business for ten years. A was paid
$15,000 in addition to the purchase price for the agreement not to
compete. Held: A received $15,000 ordinary income. Mhat a person
receives when he sells his services for wages or salary is clearly in-
come. The courts have now said that what a person receives when he
refrains from exercising his skill or ability in a particular line is like-
wise income because this is merely the converse of the employment
contract and is essentially the same thing.13 Since the Commissioner's
position has become so firmly entrenched that an employment con-
tract is not a capital asset for tax purposes, the Commissioner, with the
aid of the courts, is prone to assert that any situation which is tainted
with the flavor of an employer-employee relationship or the rendition
of services falls into that empyrean category. In this respect the Com-
missioner and the courts have not overlooked the next category, the
agency contract.
The agency contract. In Jones v. CorbynA4 the taxpayer had an
exclusive agency contract with a life insurance company. Difficulties
arose and the agent agreed to terminate the contract for a considera-
tion. The court held that the contract had substantial value, was
capable of producing income for the owner, was enforceable at law,
and had been the basis for the building up of a lucrative business
through the personal efforts of the taxpayer. The effect of the termina-
71 F. 2d 987 (D. C. Cir. 1934).
' For further illustration of this point see Kamens and Ancier, Tax Conse-
quences of a Covenant Not to Compete, 27 Taxes 891 (1949).1 4186 F. 2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950); cf. Jones v. U. S., 96 F. Supp. 973 (D.
Colo. 1951), aff'd 194 F. 2d 783 (10th Cir. 1952) where an assignment of an
interest in a franchise was allowed capital gains treatment though the franchise
was leased and all that could be sold was a present right to receive income. But
cf. McCartney v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 320 (1949).
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tion was to transfer the business to the insurance company, thus con-
stituting a sale of a capital asset.
In Smoak v. Commissioneri' A was the agent of a corporation for
leasing machines which packaged milk in paper containers. A spent
about $25,000 in setting up an office and sales organization for the
exclusive territory. Later the corporation merged with another which
decided to do its own marketing and servicing, and the new corpora-
tion purchased A's contract. The court held that A had sold an
agency business which consisted of all of the assets of the business
among which was the agency contract. Therefore, the taxpayer was
entitled to capital gains treatment.
But Williams v. Commissioner16 manifests how meticulously one
must fit his transaction into the established category which is favor-
able to the taxpayer. 1 In this case A was the general agent for a group
of fire insurance companies. He agreed to cancel the contract for
$20,000. The court held that ordinary income was realized. A's con-
tract with the insurance companies provided that he was not to be-
come a general agent for five years and one year was left to run under
the contract. The court said that since the full five years had not run,
this was not a payment for his contractual rights. Rather this was a
payment for services rendered by A under the contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Starr Brothers v.
Commissioner1 8 seems to limit further the favorable rule laid down in
Jones v. Corbyn and the Smoak case. In this case the owner of a retail
store made a contract with United Drug Company whereby he was
appointed the exclusive selling agent for United in a specified area.
The agency contract did not create an employer-employee relationship.
Later United paid the retailer over $6,000 for agreeing to terminate
the contract. This was held to be ordinary income. Notice that the
retailer had not built his entire business around the agency contract,
and he was not selling all of his business assets among which was the
agency contract. Hence the court might have found that it did not
fit into the favorable agency contract category and was not a capital
asset. However, it admitted that the contract was valuable property
and was a capital asset, but said that the decisive issue centered
around the sale or exchange requirement. The contract was not sold
but extinguished. To refer to the contract as a grant or a franchise
43 B. T. A. 907 (1941).
5 T. C. 639 (1945).
'In dealing with tax cases greater care must be used than in other areas of
the law in searching for a category which almost identically fits the fact situation
with which one is dealing.
"204 F. 2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953) reversing 18 T. 0. 149 (1952).
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would becloud the issue, because the promise was in effect a negative
covenant by United not to sell its products to any other person in a
specified area. There was a release of a negative covenant rather than
a sale, and the income was ordinary.
The same court decided General Artist Corp. v. Commissioner.9
In this case GA contracted with Frank Sinatra to become his exclusive
booking agent for a certain period. GA had approximately 270 con-
tracts with persons in the entertainment field during one year of the
Sinatra contract, and it was not in the business of selling agency con-
tracts. However GA entered into an agreement with MCA, another
booking agent, which provided that GA "sells" to MCA its agency con-
tracts with Sinatra which "shall be deemed to supersede, cancel and
take the place of" contracts between Sinatra and GA. Sinatra signed
the following endorsement:
"The undersigned is familiar with all of the terms, provisions and
conditions contained in the above contract and agrees to be bound
by the same and acknowledges that the undersigned's agreement
is an inducement to the parties to enter into the above contract."20
GA contended that it had sold a capital asset to MCA. But the
court held that though the contract may have been a capital
asset, its nature was that of a negative covenant which was re-
leased and hence it was bound by its own rule laid down in the
Starr Brothers case. In both cases the agents performed selling serv-
ices which were not necessarily personal services, hence there was not
a strict employer-employee relationship. Nor had the taxpayer built
his entire business on an agency contract which if terminated would
destroy his business as in Jones v. Corbyn. It should be noted that
the court in the General Artist and Starr Brothers cases was faced
with facts which did not fit precisely into either the favorable agency
contract or the employment contract categories. The facts seemed to
lie some place midway between. Hence the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals dipped into another category, the negative covenant, which
had not hitherto been used in this environment. It had been held
that where payment was received by a covenantor for his promise
not to compete, this was ordinary income to the covenantor.21 How-
ever, in Starr Brothers the converse was held to be income, that is,
where a covenantee released the covenantor from his negative
covenant.22 But in General Artists the court went still further and held
that even though the transaction was between the covenantee and a
"17 T. C. 1517 (1952), aff'd 205 F. 2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953).
17 T. C. 1517, 1520 (1952).
Supra note 12; supra note 13 at 892.
'A series of analogous situations are set out in note 6 supra.
KNTucKY LAw JouNAL
third person, it could qualify as a release of a negative covenant.
Since the court reached its result by way of a technical interpretation
of the sale or exchange requirement, its technical basis should be sub-
jected to close scrutiny. Ordinarily courts have distinguished two
types of transactions in regard to their satisfaction of the sale or ex-
change requirement. The first type is where the original parties to a
contract agree to cancel, release, or surrender it. Examples are can-
cellation of a lease, termination of an option contract, and surrender
of a promissory note. None of the foregoing transactions will ordi-
narily satisfy the sale or exchange requirement since no new rights
are created and there is merely an extinguishment of former rights
and duties.23 The second type transaction is where the obligee in any
of the release transactions gives up his rights in favor of a third person
for a consideration paid by the third person to the obligee. Here the
transaction is not prevented from being a sale or exchange.24 When
the transaction is not solely between the original parties to the con-
tract, the substance of the transaction is vastly changed; and the dis-
tinguishing element is the creation of new rights in the third party.
In Starr Brothers the court rightly concluded that the transaction was
a release of rights and duties between the original parties and was not
a sale or exchange, but it is doubtful if this approach is applicable to
the facts in the General Artist case. There the court sought to ration-
alize its position by this statement:
It might be suggested that the instant case differs from that of Starr
Bros. because the latter involved a release of a binding negative
covenant to the obligor, whereas here there was a transfer to a third
person of the rights under the covenant. But we think the correct
view is that here there was a release to the obligor of a negative
covenant in order to allow a new covenant...
However, in every assignment to a third party the contract right does
not pass to the assignee. The technical procedure is that the assignor
extinguishes his relations with others respecting the subject matter and
creates similar but new relations with the assignee and others.26 Thus
' Supra note 6. But one obvious exception is where the consideration received
by a tenant for cancelling his lease is treated as capital gains as pointed out by the
case in note 7.
' Sutliff v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 446 (1942) (transfer of a lease by a
tenant to a third person); McKee v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 239 (1937) (trans-
fer of bonds to a third person); G. C. M. 23677, 1943 Cum. BULL. 370 (sale of
an option contract to a third person).
'205 F. 2d 360, 361 (2dCir. 1953).
"Alienation, conveyance, and transfer, therefore, consist of some operative
action that extinguishes and creates, that substitutes a new party as the focus of
legal relations with respect to the subject matter. Such also is an 'assignment in
the law of contracts." 4 ConniN, CoNRACrs 422 (1951). Also see 2 WxUSToN,
CONTRACTS 1165 (1936).
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when the consideration moves from the third party to the obligee,
it is too fine a distinction, if not a deviation from accuracy, to say
there is a difference in assigning contract rights to a third party or in
extinguishing them between the third party and the obligor. In Gen-
eral Artists the consideration moved from MCA to GA, and no readily
observable benefits accrued to Sinatra. The transaction was made so
that MCA could be put into as nearly as possible the same position
that GA had occupied before the transaction was consummated.
Moreover, there is no reason to assume, as was done by the court, that
this contract was so personal in nature that it could not be carried out
by another booking agent. In fact this is precisely what happened.27
Because consent by the obligee changes the rule that personal con-
tracts are not assignable, 28 and since Sinatra consented in writing to
the assignment, there is no barrier to the assignment except chance
words which were used in the contract. But the case should not turn
upon the point that the parties happened to use both the words "sale"
and "cancel" in the same contract.
There surely cannot be that efficacy in lawyers' jargon that termina-
tion or cancellation or surrender carries some peculiar significance
vastly penalizing laymen whose counsel have chanced to use them.
If the court felt bound to hold that this was not a capital transaction,
it would have been on safer ground to have said that all GA owned
was a right to receive income and that assignment of this right would
not convert it into a capital asset.
Conclusion: An ultimate payment realized upon a right to receive
income will obviously be treated as ordinary income. Thus it follows
that a contract right which is nothing more than a right to receive
income is ordinarily not a capital asset, and the consideration received
for the assignment or cancellation of such a contract will not be al-
lowed capital gains treatment. A person's talent and the capacity to
work is a valuable property right, but payment for the use of his
talent or capacity to work, or for refraining from the use of either
will ordinarily be classified as ordinary income. Therefore, an assign-
ment or cancellation of a contract embodying these elements will not
convert it into a capital asset for purposes of taxation. However, with
a slight change of facts the taxpayer may be considered a joint ad-
venturer or partner and thus the contract determined to be a capital
asset. Too, an exclusive agency contract which does not create a strict
- See General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. 1517, 1524 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
"4 Amf. Jutn. 286 (1936).
" McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. 2d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 1946).
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employer-employee relationship but requires the rendition of services
may be held to be a capital asset, and payment for the termination of
such a contract may constitute a sale if the contract is sold as a part
of a going business. Yet, when the contract is in the nature of a
negative covenant, payment by the covenantor to the covenantee for
its cancellation may be said to be a release of the covenant which
transfers nothing to the covenantee, thus preventing a sale or exchange.
Ordinarily when a transaction is made with a third party, it has a
better chance of producing capital gains than a direct settlement with
the obligor which cancels, releases, or surrenders the contract. How-
ever, an exclusive agency contract which is framed in terms of a nega-
tive covenant may not be aided by this fact. But without this fact,
consideration received by a tenant for his agreement to cancel the
lease is treated as a capital gain.
WniTim J. BiuGcs
"PURCHASE-MONEY' TRUSTS IN KENTUCKY
In the recent case of Sewell v. Sewell' the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky reaffirmed the rule that under the Kentucky statute prohibiting
purchase-money resulting trusts no trust arises when a deed is made
to one person and the consideration is paid by another, unless the
grantee takes the deed in his own name without the consent of the
person paying the consideration or unless the grantee, in violation of
a trust or an agreement, purchases the land with the effects of another
person. The court said there must be clear and convincing proof
that title was taken without consent of the payor, and held that no
trust would arise in favor of decedent's wife where the admissible
evidence tended to show that her husband took title with her knowl-
edge and without objection on her part prior to his death.2 The court
expressly refused to reconcile what it called "the apparent conflict
'260 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953).
'It was held that the only competent evidence was testimony concerning
statements made by the deceased to several neighbors. The testimony of the wife
that she furnished funds to her husband was held incompetent on the theory that
it concerned a confidential communication between husband and wife and a
transaction with a person since deceased both within the inhibition of the Civil
Code of Practice.
In such situations the wife has been held to be competent on the ground
that her rights arose by operation of law and not from any transaction with her
husband. 26 Am. Jun. 731 (1940). However, usually a cestui que trust or one
attempting to impress a trusteeship on another is incompetent to testify to a trans-
action with a person since deceased where his interest would be directly effected
by the result. 70 C. J. 124 (1935).
